This paper employs a unique, largely hand-gathered dataset to investigate the determinants of both foreign currency (FX) 
Introduction
The theories of optimal hedging argue that a range of firm attributes, such as its growth opportunities (Froot et al. 1993) or the probability that it will get into financial distress (Smith and Stulz 1985) , determines derivatives usage. However, consideration of the literature pertaining to derivatives usage quickly reveals the disparity in empirical findings. Whereas some studies find evidence that agrees with the theory, others find evidence that directly contradicts it. For example, Visvanathan (1998) finds that firms with higher leverage, hence a higher probability of financial distress, have a higher probability of interest rate derivatives usage.
However, Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find that such firms have a lower probability of foreign currency derivatives usage. Table 1 breaks down a selection of these studies by geographic location of the samples selected, the scope of their investigations, and the models employed.
With respect to scope, the third column illustrates how much of the previous research focuses on the determinants of certain classifications of derivatives usageforeign currency (FX), interest rate (IR) or commodity price (CP) -whereas others examine general, or aggregate, derivatives usage. Examining general derivatives usage presupposes that the different categories of derivatives share common determinants. However, if the theories of optimal hedging do not apply equally to FX, IR and CP derivatives usage, then they should be disaggregated and examined separately. Furthermore, comparisons between different studies should be restricted to only those that examine the same classification of derivatives.
[Insert Table 1 here] The fourth column shows the range of models employed to examine firms' derivatives usage. Studies that exclusively examine the usage decision employ either a Logit or a Probit model. Generally, the requirement is that a firm discloses derivatives usage, even qualitatively, to be classified as a derivatives user. Hence, firms with widely varying magnitudes of derivatives usage are broadly categorized as users, which can introduce a large amount of measurement error. Studies that examine the extent of firms' derivatives usage, most commonly measured with gross notional amounts, use either a Tobit or a two-part model, which differ in their assumptions of firms' decision processes: those that assume that the binary derivatives usage and extent of usage are jointly decided in one step employ the Tobit model, whereas those that assume firms decide on the extent of usage only after they have decided to use derivatives employ a two-part or hurdle model. Perhaps a reason for the apparent disparity in empirical findings is the lack of consensus on which model is the most representative of firms' actual decision processes.
In addition to scope and model employment, studies also vary in their selection of explanatory variables. For instance, of the nine studies that examine the determinants of FX derivatives usage in Table 1 , only five control for FX exposure with some measure for foreign sales (Allayannis and Ofek 2001 , Bartram et al. 2009 , Elliott et al. 2003 , Géczy et al. 1997 , Muller and Verschoor 2005 . Of the six studies that examine the determinants of IR derivatives usage, none attempt to directly control for IR exposure beyond using the leverage ratio. Only Graham and Rogers (2002) , who examine the determinants of general derivatives usage, include a proxy for interest rate exposure in the sum of short-term and floating rate debt (as a percentage of total debt).
This study contributes to the literature in five ways. Firstly, we use a European sample. As Table 1 illustrates, the majority of the previous empirical work examining derivatives usage is US-based. Before the introduction of IAS39 in 1998, European firms disclosed relatively little information on risk management, perhaps viewing it as a competitive advantage. Hence, few empirical studies have examined the determinants of derivatives usage in a European context. Of those that have, Gebhardt (1999), De Ceuster et al. (2000) and Bodnar et al. (2013) examine survey data from German, Belgian, Dutch and Italian firms, respectively. Of the previous studies that use data gathered directly from firms' annual reports, only Muller and Verschoor (2005) examine the determinants for an exclusively European sample, whereas Bartram, Brown and Fehle (2009) and Lel (2012) include European firms in global samples. 1 Secondly, we examine the determinants of FX and IR derivatives separately, in addition to general derivatives usage. We find that some variables are statistically significant determinants of FX but not IR derivatives usage, and vice versa. In some cases, variables have the opposite effect on FX and IR derivatives usage. We show that, were we to solely examine the determinants of general derivatives usage, the significance of these variables is weakened or lost entirely. Thirdly, we model firms' derivatives usage with a Tobit model and a two-part model separately. With respect to the two-part model, we find in some instances that variables are statistically significant determinants of the usage decision but not the extent of usage decision, and vice versa, lending support to the hypothesis that firms make their derivatives decisions in two separate steps. Similar to above, we show that our ability to detect these effects would have been weakened were we to restrict our analysis to a Tobit model, which assumes a one-step decision process.
Fourthly, many previous studies are constrained by their use of accounting data that are readily available from databases such as Compustat and DataStream.
Whilst such data are similarly used here, they are augmented with hand-gathered data on firms' notional derivatives usage, as well as various explanatory variables such as FX exposure, IR exposure, debt maturity, and tax loss carry forwards. This process minimizes bias with respect to both measurement error and omitted variables, and aligns our proxies with the theoretical firm attributes that they are designed to represent.
Lastly, if a two-step process is the most suitable model to examine firms' derivatives usage then an important question has remained unanswered in the literature as to whether sample selection bias is present or not. In order to accurately investigate sample selection bias, one needs to identify an exclusion restriction, that is, there should be at least one independent variable that determines derivatives usage that does not affect the extent of usage. For this purpose, we manually gather a bespoke measure of variable executive compensation and argue that risk-averse managers with compensation that is variable in nature are more likely to use derivatives even when it is suboptimal to do so, but are unable to increase their derivatives usage with increasing variable compensation because this would signal their suboptimal behavior. We find no evidence that sample selection is present although this is caveated by the lack of statistical significance on the exclusion restriction. This paper proceeds as follows: Sections 2 and 3 discuss the sample creation and data collection processes, respectively. Section 4 describes the assumptions that underpin both the Tobit and two-part models. Section 5 reports the results of both the Tobit and two-part models, whereas Section 6 reports the results of the Heckman model, which investigates if sample selection bias is present. Section 7 concludes.
Sample Construction
The sample comprises firms from the original eleven Eurozone member states -Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain that are listed on the European Union DataStream Index. The number of stocks for each country is determined by the size of the market and the sample covers 75-80% of total market capitalization for that country. 2 DataStream reviews index constituents quarterly and re-sets them to represent the new top group of stocks by market value. The sample represents those firms included in the index in December 2010. The initial sample comprised 1209 firms. Two annual reports were sourced from the "investor relations" section of each firm's official website for the fiscal years ending in 2009 and 2010. The criteria for remaining in the sample are as follows:
 Must be a non-financial firm. Financial firms excluded from the sample are banks, building societies, insurance and real estate firms. Quasi-financial entities such as buyout, royalties and licensing firms are also excluded.
 Full, machine-readable, annual reports must be available, including notes to the accounts.
 Firms' annual reports must be available in English.
 Firms must report in Euro.
 Accounts must be prepared in compliance with IFRS.
Financial firms were excluded because they could be market makers in the derivatives and debt markets. This is standard practice in the literature pertaining to derivatives usage (see Géczy et al., 1997; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Bartram et al., 2009 ). The final sample, after eliminating on the basis of the above criteria, comprised 710 non-financial firms, which, over two years, equals 1420 firm-year observations. Table 2 provides a breakdown of derivatives usage by country, industry and firm size (total assets) for the pooled sample. Firms are classified as FX derivatives users if they disclose the usage of FX forwards, futures, options or cross currency swaps. Firms are described as IR derivatives users if they disclose the usage of IR options, IR swaps, floating rate agreements (FRAs), caps, floors or cross currency swaps. 3 
[Insert Table 2 here]
Of the 1420 firm-year observations, 917 (64.6%) are FX derivatives users.
This compares with Géczy et al. (1997) , who find that only 41% of US firms used FX derivatives in 1991, and Bartram et al. (2009) derivatives, usage is more evenly balanced across countries. Almost 80% of French and 65% of German firms, the two largest countries in the sample, are IR derivatives users. Firms from the Netherlands were the least frequent users of IR derivatives with 47% usage. Our results are therefore very similar to those found in previous studies using survey data with Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) finding that 78% of German firms use derivatives, De Ceuster et al. (2000) finding that 79% of Belgian firms use derivatives, whereas Bodnar et al. (2003) finds that only 60% of Dutch firms use derivatives and Bodnar et al. (2013) finds that only 56% (65%) of Italian firms use FX (IR) derivatives.
The middle section of Table 2 partitions the sample by industry. FX derivatives usage rates are highest for consumer goods (77%) and basic materials (73%) firms. In contrast, usage rates are lowest for telecommunications (53%) and technology (41%) firms. Géczy et al. (1997) similarly find that consumer goods (66%) firms had the highest percentage of FX derivatives users in 1991. Bartram et al. (2009) The lowermost section of Table 2 shows the results of partitioning the sample by size. The largest firms are clearly the most prolific users of both FX and IR derivatives: 88% of the quartile of largest observations are FX derivatives users, in contrast to just 33% of the quartile of smallest firms. Similarly, 87% of the quartile of largest observations are IR derivatives users, in contrast to just 39% of the quartile of smallest firms. Both Géczy et al. (1997) and Borokhovich et al. (2004) find similarly with FX derivatives and IR derivatives usage, respectively, with increasing firm size although the percentages are noticeably smaller. For instance, Géczy et al. (1997) find that 75% of the quartile of largest firms used FX derivatives in 1991, in contrast with 17% of the quartile of smallest firms. Borokhovich et al. (2004) find that 67% of the quartile of largest firms used IR derivatives in 1995, in contrast with 31% of the quartile of smallest firms. Our results therefore show that, as well as larger firms being more likely to use derivatives, the proportion of firms using derivatives has shifted upwards across firms of all sizes over the last twenty years.
Data

Dependent variables
Gross notional FX derivatives: As a continuous measure of the extent of FX derivatives usage we manually gathered the total notional value of FX derivatives from the notes to the accounts, and scaled by total assets. 4 As above, FX derivatives are defined as all forwards, futures, options and cross-currency swaps. Similar to Bartram, Brown and Fehle (2009) , the search terms used were "derivative", "fair value", "notional", "reference", "nominal", "hedg*", "swap", "forward", "foreign", "currency" and "option".
Usage of the total, or gross, notional value of FX derivatives (or any category of derivatives) is not without contention. As Smith Jr (1995) Nonetheless, most of the previous studies that use a continuous measure of firm's derivatives usage use the total notional amount (Allayannis and Ofek 2001 , Borokhovich et al. 2004 , Gay and Nam 1998 , Graham and Rogers 2002 , Hentschel and Kothari 2001 , Howton and Perfect 1998 , Lel 2012 , Muller and Verschoor 2005 . Hentschel and Kothari (2001, p.96) justify the usage of total notional amount as follows: although one would expect financial firms to hold offsetting positions to run a "balanced book", non-financial firms have no obvious reason to hold offsetting derivatives positions. Consequently, similar to these studies, we proxy for the extent of firms' FX derivatives usage using the gross notional value of FX derivatives, scaled by total assets. Usable data is obtained for 1297 out of 1420 firm-year observations, 759 FX derivatives users and 538 non-users. 5 Descriptive statistics for this and all the other variables are provided in Table 3 . The mean level of notional FX derivatives usage scaled by total assets is 8.1%. This compares with Howton and Perfect (1998) at 9%, Allayannis and Ofek (2001) at 3%, and Graham and Rogers (2002) [Insert Table 3 here] Gross notional IR derivatives: Similar to FX derivatives, as a continuous measure of the extent of IR derivatives usage we manually gathered the total notional value of IR derivatives, scaled by total assets. As above, IR derivatives are defined as all IR options, IR swaps, floating rate agreements (FRAs), caps, floors and cross currency swaps. The search terms used were "derivative", "fair value", "notional", "reference", "nominal", "hedg*", "swap", "floating", "variable", "rate", "cap", "floor" and "option". 5 In Section 2, the criteria for being classified as an FX derivatives user is simply qualitative disclosure of usage anywhere in the annual report. This is standard practice in the literature examining the binary usage decision so we use the same methodology to produce Table 2 , which can be directly compared to such studies (e.g. Bartram et al., 2009 , Géczy et al., 1997 . Using these criteria, we find 917 users and 503 non-users of FX derivatives. However, when manually gathering data on the notional amount of FX derivatives usage, we find that, of the 917 observations classified as users, 123 do not disclose a notional amount. A further 35 observations qualitatively disclose FX derivatives usage somewhere in the annual report but then report a zero notional amount in the notes to the accounts. Consequently, we have usable notional data on 1297 observations, 759 of which are FX derivatives users and 538 are non-users. This is standard practice among previous studies that use a continuous measure of derivatives usage (e.g. Gay and Nam, 1998, Graham and Rogers, 2002) .
Usable data is obtained for 1308 firm-year observations, 829 IR derivatives users and 479 non-users. The mean level of notional IR derivatives usage scaled by total assets is 9.9%. This compares with Howton and Perfect (1998) at 14%, Graham and Rogers (2002) at 11%, and Borokhovich et al. (2004) at 9.2%.
Independent variables
The Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrelevance proposition shows that, in perfect capital markets, corporate financing decisions cannot affect the value of a firm. In reality, however, markets are not perfect and taxes, agency costs, bankruptcy costs, transaction costs and information asymmetries can make it beneficial for the firm to hedge its risks. Thus, most of the theories on what makes it optimal for a firm to use derivatives introduce some form of friction into the assumption of perfect capital markets. These are broadly defined as the theories of optimal hedging and include underinvestment costs and financial distress costs.
Underinvestment costs:
As future cash flows are uncertain, the availability of internal funds to finance future projects varies significantly. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) argue that hedging lowers the probability of low cash flows, which helps to ensure that the firm has sufficient internal funds to invest in such projects where such funds might otherwise be scarce. Firms with investment opportunities, or growth opportunities, will therefore benefit from using derivatives. In this study, the market-to-book ratio, R&D expenditures and capital expenditures are used to proxy for firms' growth opportunities. A positive relationship is hypothesized between all three proxies and derivatives usage. Data for each are available on DataStream WorldScope, the calculations and sources of which are presented in Table 4 .
[Insert Table 4 here]
Costs of financial distress: The payment obligations associated with debt financing can increase the probability of financial distress if cash flows are insufficient to meet them (Shapiro and Titman 1986 ). This could lead to limitations in further borrowing, reputational damage, the breakdown of relationships with suppliers, the loss of customers, the distraction of management attention, risk premia in the form of higher employee compensation, and, in the event of bankruptcy, accounting and legal fees (Aretz and Bartram 2010) . This probability of such events occurring is an increasing function of leverage. Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that, as derivatives usage decreases the probability of realizing these left tail outcomes, it lowers the expected costs of financial distress. This study focuses on leverage and seven additional firm characteristics as proxies for the costs of financial distress: operating margin, quick ratio, dividend yield, asset tangibility, firm size, debt maturity and tax loss carry forwards.
To the extent that higher leverage increases the likelihood of financial distress, a positive relationship is expected with derivatives usage. Less profitable and less liquid firms are also more likely to have difficulty meeting their payment obligations so a negative relation is hypothesized between both operating margin and derivatives usage, and the quick ratio and derivatives usage. The dividend yield could provide an alternative proxy for liquidity in that firms that pay out low dividends have more funds available to pay fixed claims (Nance et al. 1993) . Lower dividend paying firms have less need to hedge to avoid financial distress so a positive relationship would therefore be expected with derivatives usage. With respect to asset tangibility, Howton and Perfect (1998) argue that if a firm is forced to liquidate its assets, tangible assets are easier to sell at near book value than intangible assets that are only valuable if the firm continues as a going concern.
Hence, a negative relationship is predicted with derivatives usage. From a firm size point of view, Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) argue that, since smaller firms incur higher proportional bankruptcy costs, they are more likely to use derivatives.
This implies a negative relationship between firm size and derivatives usage. On the other hand, large firms might exhibit economies of scale using derivatives, which would imply a positive relationship. The empirical evidence with respect to size unanimously supports the economies of scale incentive to use derivatives (Berkman and Bradbury 1996 , Borokhovich, Brunarski, Crutchley and Simkins 2004 , Fok et al. 1997 , Géczy, Minton and Schrand 1997 , Graham and Rogers 2002 , Guay 1999 , Judge 2006 , Lel 2012 , Lin and Smith 2007 , Mian 1996 , Nance, Smith and Smithson 1993 , Rogers 2002 .
While the data needed to measure the above variables are available on DataStream, data on debt maturity and tax loss carry forwards were manually collected from firms' annual reports. With respect to debt maturity, previous studies generally use the fraction of debt that is due after a certain period as a measure of debt maturity. 6 Titman (1992) builds a theoretical model in which borrowers with favorable private information about future prospects prefer short-term debt as the debt can be re-priced when new information becomes available. However, shortterm debt increases liquidity risk and the probability of financial distress. Firms with short-term debt are therefore predicted to be more likely to use derivatives. In order to minimize measurement error, we use a bespoke, manually gathered measure that utilizes firms' annual report disclosures to the full extent. As per the calculation in Table 4 , we take the fraction of a firm's debt that matures in less than 1 year and weigh it by the midpoint between 0 and 1 year, i.e. 0.5 years. Similarly, we take the fraction of debt that matures between 1 and 5 years and weigh it at its midpoint, i.e. 3 years. Lastly, the fraction of debt that matures after 5 years is weighed at 7.5 years. 7 The search terms used to find the relevant section of the annual reports were "maturit*", "schedule", "liquidity risk", "financial liabil*" and "less than".
With respect to tax loss carry forwards, Graham and Rogers (2002) argue that if firms face convex tax schedules, derivatives usage reduces the expected tax liability by reducing the volatility of pretax profits. Convex tax schedules can arise directly through progressive marginal tax rates or indirectly through tax shields such as tax loss carry forwards. Hence a positive relationship is hypothesized with derivatives usage. Alternatively, Judge (2006) suggests that tax loss carry forwards can be used to identify firms that have recently suffered from or are currently experiencing financial distress, again implying a positive relationship with derivatives usage. We manually gather data on the magnitude of tax loss carry forwards from annual report disclosures, similar to Graham and Rogers (2002) and Lin and Smith (2007) . The search terms used were "tax loss", "carry forward", "carried forward", "carry forward", "losses", "deferred tax" and "deferred".
Market exposure : Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) suggests that, while capital market imperfections are necessary to justify FX derivatives usage, a firm's ultimate decision also depends on sufficiently large exposure to FX risk. As such, several of the previous studies that examine the determinants of derivatives usage, FX or otherwise, include proxies for FX exposure such as foreign sales, foreign assets and foreign debt in their respective models (Allayannis and Ofek 2001 , Bartram, Brown and Fehle 2009 , Elliott, Huffman and Makar 2003 , Géczy, Minton and Schrand 1997 , Graham and Rogers 2002 , Judge 2006 , Muller and Verschoor 2005 , Muller and Verschoor 2006 . 8 In this study, we manually gather data on both foreign sales and foreign debt from firms' annual reports. The search terms used to find the relevant section on the geographical segmentation of sales were "geographic segment", "geograph", "sales by", "sales", "revenues by", "revenues", "by region", "region", "by segment", "segment", and "currenc*. Similarly, the search terms used to find the geographical segmentation of debt were "financial liabil*", "interest bearing", "currencies", "liquidity risk" and "currenc*".
Of the previous studies that examine the determinants of derivatives usage, IR or otherwise, only Graham and Rogers (2002) attempt to control for IR exposure.
The authors include the sum of short term and variable rate debt (as a percentage of total debt) as an explanatory variable and find a positive, albeit statistically insignificant, relationship with general derivatives usage. In this study, variable rate debt scaled by total debt is used as a proxy for IR exposure. As with the proxies for FX exposure, this data is manually gathered from firms' annual reports. The search terms used were "variable rate", "variable interest", "floating rate", "floating interest", "fixed rate", "fixed interest", "floating", "variable" and "fixed".
Model Selection
Corporate risk management research is often concerned with the determinants of firms' derivatives usage. However, the extent of derivatives usage can only be observed for firms that use derivatives. Thus, the model chosen must accommodate a limited, or censored, dependent variable. As Woodridge (2010, p.517) points out, there are two types of censoring: 1) true censoring, whereby a data problem precludes observation above or below some value for some part of the population and 2) a corner solution outcome, whereby the independent variable is an observable choice or outcome. Examples of corner solutions are an individual's expenditure on life insurance or a firm's expenditure on R&D. For some individuals and firms, the optimal choice will be the corner solution, i.e. zero expenditures. The model that Wooldridge (2010, p.519 ) prescribes for such a situation is the Tobit model. Hence, previous studies that model firms' derivatives usage with a Tobit model implicitly assume that a firm's choice not to use derivatives is optimal to that particular firm, i.e. derivatives usage does not add value. Thus, within the Tobit model is the very strong assumption that the same stochastic process determines both whether the dependent variable is greater than zero and the value of the dependent variable conditional on it being greater than zero. In other words, one single decision governs the usage of derivatives and the extent of usage.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Haushalter (2000), on the other hand, suggests that the decision to use derivatives might instead be made in two steps: First, a firm must decide to use derivatives. Then, if it decides to use, it must determine the extent of usage. Dolde and Mishra (2007) describe this first step as a qualitative decision. For those that decide to use derivatives, a second, quantitative decision governs the extent of usage. Consequently, a two-part model (or hurdle model) would be more appropriate, with each part having separate determinants. Greene (2006, p713) refers to the subset of firms that do not use derivatives as not censored but instead "incidentally truncated". This scenario can be modeled with two equations; a selection equation describing derivatives usage followed by a truncated OLS regression describing the extent of derivatives usage. The selection equation is:
( 1) where zi * is a latent variable representing the utility of a firm entering a derivatives program, wi is a vector of factors known to determine a firm's decision to use derivatives, and ui is the error term. The latent variable is not observed but an indicator variable, zi, is, such that: { Given the dichotomous nature of zi, the first step can be modeled with a probit regression. The second step, truncated OLS regression is:
where yi is the gross notional amount of derivatives, xi is a vector of factors known to determine the extent the extent of derivatives usage, and εi is the error term.
In the next section, we examine the determinants of firms' FX and IR derivatives usage, as well as general derivatives usage, using both the Tobit and the two-part model. Section 6 examines firms' derivatives usage with Heckman's model, which detects and corrects for sample selection bias. [Insert Table 5 here]
Results
Tobit Model
However, when we disaggregate general derivatives into FX and IR derivatives, we find that the only determinant that has the same effect on FX and IR derivatives usage is firm size, which has a positive effect on both. With respect to FX derivatives, the positive coefficient on foreign sales (0.170) suggests that firms with higher FX exposure use a higher level. Consistent with theoretical predictions but contrary to the findings with respect to general derivatives, we find evidence, albeit weak, that firms with lower profitability use a higher level of derivatives. The positive coefficient on asset tangibility (0.088) is contrary to that predicted by Howton and Perfect (1998) . One possible explanation is that firms with lower asset tangibility are more operationally hedged insofar as they can shift operations in response to FX movements so have less need to use FX derivatives. This is also evident in Table 2 whereby knowledge-based technology firms have the lowest usage of FX derivatives and asset-intensive basic materials, consumer goods and industrials firms have the highest usage.
With respect to IR derivatives, the positive coefficient on variable rate debt (0.084) suggests that firms with higher IR exposure use a higher level. The remaining capital structure variables, the leverage ratio and debt maturity, also determine the level of IR derivatives usage, although in the latter's case it is opposite to that predicted by the theory. Contrary to the findings with respect to FX derivatives, we find that firms with lower FX exposure and higher profitability use a higher level of IR derivatives. Firms with higher market to book ratios and lower quick ratios also use a higher level of IR derivatives, consistent with the underinvestment costs and financial distress costs theories of optimal hedging, respectively. However, contrary to theoretical predictions, the coefficients on dividend yield and tax loss carry forwards are both negative. On the whole, Table 5 illustrates the need to disaggregate general derivatives usage to isolate the singular effect that certain variables have on either FX or IR derivatives usage. Table 6 presents the results of the two-part model. As outlined in Section 4, the two-part model allows the determinants of the usage and extent of usage decisions to differ. Hence, for general, FX and IR derivatives, we examine the determinants of the usage decision with a probit model and the extent of usage decision with a truncated OLS model. With respect to FX derivatives, the middle section of Table 6 shows that while firm size, foreign sales, low profitability and asset tangibility strongly predict the usage of FX derivatives, firm size is the sole determinant of the extent of derivatives usage. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) similarly find that, while many variables determine the FX derivatives usage decision, only firm size and foreign sales determine the extent of usage. Also similar to this study, the authors find that firms with higher leverage are less likely to use FX derivatives, contrary to theoretical predictions. This could be indicative of firms using leverage as an alternative means to hedge FX exposure than FX derivatives, although we find that the level of foreign debt is not statistically significant. 9 On the whole, our results lend support to the theory that firms manage FX risk in a two-part decision process; first, whether or not to use FX derivatives, then second, how much to use.
Two-Part Model
With respect to IR derivatives, the positive coefficients on the leverage ratio and IR exposure, as proxied by variable rate debt, in the first stage probit regression are both consistent with theoretical predictions. However, the positive coefficient on debt maturity in the first stage suggests that firms with short-term debt are less likely to use IR derivatives, similar to Bartram, Brown and Fehle (2009) but contrary to the theory. The negative coefficient on the quick ratio in the probit regression strongly suggests that less liquid firms are more likely to use IR derivatives. With respect to firm size, the positive coefficient implies that economies of scale motivate the IR derivatives usage decision. Lastly, the negative coefficient on tax loss carry forwards runs counter to theoretical predictions. 9 A money market hedge, whereby a firm can issue foreign debt to hedge foreign currency receivables, is equivalent, and therefore an alternative means to selling the receivables forward using FX derivatives (Aabo, 2006; Judge, 2008, 2009; Elliott et al, 2003) .
[Insert Table 6 here]
With respect to the extent of IR derivatives usage decision, we find the leverage ratio and variable rate debt are both positively related to the extent of IR derivatives usage decision, as they are for the binary usage decision and consistent with theoretical predictions. However, we find conflicting evidence for the underinvestment costs motive. Whereas the positive coefficient on the market-tobook ratio is as predicted, the negative coefficient on the R&D ratio is contrary to theoretical predictions. Regarding the financial distress costs motive, both the positive coefficient on operating margin and the negative coefficient on dividend yield also run contrary to theoretical predictions. Recall that the financial distress costs motive for hedging predicts that firms with lower profitability and higher dividends will hedge more. Again, similar to the FX derivatives specification, our results support the theory that firms manage IR risk in a two-part decision process. 
Robustness Testing
Sample Selection Bias
Sample selection bias can occur when unobserved firm characteristics influence both the usage and extent of usage decisions. 10 These unobserved characteristics enter equations (1) and (2) through the error terms, ui and εi, respectively (Section 4). In the context of derivatives usage, Dionne and Triki (2005) find that the education level of firms' directors is an important determinant of the hedging level for a small sample of gold mining firms. However, from an empiricist's point of view, the quality of that education or the managers' ability, both of which could also be argued to determine derivatives usage, are difficult, if not impossible, to measure. If such unobserved factors are important factors in a firm's hedging decisions, it will select into the sample of derivatives users due to high values for ui, and not because they have high values for observable firm characteristics such as FX exposure (foreign sales). Therefore, in the sample of users in equation (2), the level of, say, unobserved financial education would be higher among those firms with low FX exposure than the level of unobserved financial education with high FX exposure.
FX exposure and financial education will therefore be negatively correlated for the sample of derivatives users, which could lead to biased estimates of βi in equation
(2).
The first step Heckman's selection model is estimated using a probit model as it is in the two-part model. The difference with Heckman's model is that the predicted probabilities of derivatives usage are retained for each observation and an inverse Mills ratio, λi, is calculated for each. This is then included as an additional explanatory variable in the second step of Heckman's model, which is again a truncated OLS regression, where the dependent variable is the extent of derivatives usage:
Equation (3) now produces consistent estimates of βi (Greene, 2003, p783) . After estimation, the presence and direction of selection bias is inferred from a simple ttest on the significance of the estimated coefficient of λi, (Greene, 2006, p714) .
However, Sartori (2003) argues that there should be at least one independent variable in the selection equation that is not in the OLS regression. 11
Consider the case where the variables that determine derivatives usage, wi, are identical to the variables that determine the extent of usage, xi. Hence, when xi = wi, xi enters equation (3) linearly (the first term) and near linearly through a simple 11 Achen (1986, p99) exemplifies such an "exclusion restriction" with college admissions: whether or not a student's parents attended a certain college affects admission (the selection equation) but not the student's performance after being admitted.
function of xi in the inverse Mills ratio. Equation (4) is therefore likely to suffer from multicollinearity. 12
While we acknowledge the difficulty in identifying a perfect candidate, i.e.
one that theoretically determines a firm's binary derivatives usage decision but not the extent of usage decision, we construct a bespoke proxy for managerial risk aversion for this purpose. We argue that shareholders would likely condone managers implementing or maintaining a derivatives program even though it could be motivated by managerial risk aversion rather than value maximization. Indeed, Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that it pays to let such managers hedge as the reduction in risk increases the incentive to accept risky, but positive NPV, projects.
Lel (2012) finds confirmatory evidence that managerial share ownership increases the likelihood of derivatives usage.
On the other hand, we contend that the managers of derivatives users would be unable to justify increasing the extent of usage with increasing share ownership as this would signal their sub-optimal, value damaging behavior to shareholders.
Indeed, several studies find that the extent of derivatives usage is unaffected by managerial share ownership (Allayannis and Ofek 2001 , Gay and Nam 1998 , Knopf et al. 2002 , Marsden and Prevost 2005 .
Thus, we hypothesize that, while the binary derivatives usage decision is determined by managerial risk aversion in the form of variable rate compensation, the extent of usage is unaffected for those that use. To that end, we manually gather 12 Bushway et al. (2007, p163) point out that because the inverse Mills ratio is calculated using a non-linear probit model, λβ will not be perfectly correlated with xi. However, "the probit model will be linear for mid-values values of X, and is truly nonlinear only when X takes on extreme values. As evidence of this problem, scholars often report very high correlations between λ and regressors in the substantive equation." data and measure managerial risk aversion as the percentage of annual managerial compensation that is variable, including shares, option and bonus awards. Table 7 shows that the inverse Mills ratio is statistically insignificant in all three Heckman models, examining general, FX and IR derivatives usage. We therefore find no evidence that sample selection bias is present, that is, the determinants of the extent of firms' derivatives usage are unbiased by the probability of using derivatives. This implies that we are not ignoring any unobserved/immeasurable variables that could influence firms' selection into the group of derivatives users. However, of immediate concern to the model specification is the lack of statistical significance on the exclusion restriction, variable executive compensation, in the first step, probit model. This suggests that our instrument has limited explanatory power with respect to a firms' binary usage decision and is therefore weak. If the instrument is weak, multicollinearity is likely to persist. To measure the degree of multicollinearity in equation 3, the extent of usage equation, we employ variance inflation factors (VIFs). VIFs measure how much the variance, and hence the standard errors, are inflated by the existence of correlation among the independent variables in the model. The general rules of thumb are that a VIF of 1 for an independent variable means that there is little correlation between that independent variable and the remaining independent variables, a VIF of 4 warrants further investigation, and a VIF of 10 is a sign of severe multicollinearity (Hair et al. 2009 , Marquaridt 1970 , Mason et al. 2003 ). On running this diagnostic, we find that the inverse Mills ratio has a VIF of 8.01, confirming that the instrument is weak.
Results
[Insert Table 7 here]
Although we find no evidence of sample selection bias with respect to corporate firms' usage of derivatives, importantly, we cannot deny its presence due to multicollinearity. None of the previous studies that use the Heckman selection and conclude that sample selection is not present report attempts to identify the usage decision (Barton 2001 , Borokhovich, Brunarski, Crutchley and Simkins 2004 , Lel 2012 . Nonetheless, without any evidence of sample selection bias, the appropriate model is the simple two-part model without correction as per Figure 1 .
Conclusions
In this study, we use a unique sample with manually gathered data to investigate what motivates European firms' derivatives usage. We differentiate between FX and IR derivatives, and also between the usage decision and extent of usage decision. Our findings strongly suggest that the universal theories of optimal derivatives usage do not apply equally to FX and IR derivatives usage. Moreover, the same theories do not equally apply to the usage and extent decisions. An implication of our findings is that the universal theories of optimal derivatives usage need to be redesigned to reflect that, not only are firms' FX and IR derivatives policies determined by different factors, but also that the usage and extent decisions are determined by different factors.
On our evidence, the decision to use FX derivatives is determined by firm size, lending support to the economies of scale theory of optimal derivatives usage.
We find no evidence to support the theory that underinvestment costs motivate the FX derivatives usage decision. With respect to the costs of financial distress on the other hand, we find that firms with lower profitability are more likely to use FX derivatives. However, when it comes to the extent of FX derivatives usage, our evidence shows that this decision is determined by firm size, lending support to the economies of scale theory of optimal derivatives usage, alone.
Likewise, the decision to use IR derivatives is determined by firm size and, hence, economies of scale. Again, we find no evidence that underinvestment costs determine the IR derivatives usage decision. However, we find strong support for the costs of financial distress theory of optimal derivatives usage in that firms with higher leverage are more likely to use IR derivatives. We also find the proportion of this leverage that is variable determines IR derivatives usage. On the other hand, when it comes to the extent of IR derivatives usage, our evidence shows that, while leverage and the nature of that leverage remain significant determinants, economies of scale are no longer so. Additionally, firms with higher profits and lower dividend payouts are found to use more IR derivatives, which contradict the costs of financial distress theory of optimal derivatives usage. Although we find no evidence to support the underinvestment costs theory with respect to FX derivatives usage, we find conflicting evidence with IR derivatives. For instance, while we find that firms with growth opportunities, as proxied by higher market-to-book ratios, use more IR derivatives, firms with lower R&D expenditures also use more IR derivatives, contrary to theoretical predictions.
One possible explanation for the determinants of firms' FX and IR derivatives usage differing is due to the contrasting availability of alternatives to hedge FX and IR risks. For instance, a firm with IR exposure has few options but to use IR derivatives. On the other hand, a firm with FX exposure has a range of internal and external mechanisms. For example, an exporting firm could open a production facility in the market to which it sells its products in order to match foreign denominated revenues with foreign costs. Alternatively, the same exporting firm could borrow in the foreign currency, thereby matching expected foreign denominated revenues with foreign debt repayments. Thus, while foreign operations and foreign debt are less flexible and assured hedges than FX derivatives, they do highlight the likelihood that FX derivatives are nested in larger 'suite' of options than are available to hedge IR exposure. Consequently, while it is possible that the theory is perfectly appropriate with respect to firms' broader hedging decisions, it will not be borne out by an empirical examination of derivatives usage, alone. Rather, one would need to examine the full range of internal and external mechanisms to ascertain their true determinants. Until such time as firms are required to comprehensively disclose their corporate risk management activities, this issue could be resolved by augmenting the type of empirical work carried out in this study with comprehensive, individual-firm case studies. 1st
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